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ABSTRACT
LISA COURTNEY FOX: Finding Freedom:  Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt, and Herbert 
Marcuse on Post-Totalitarian Politics
(Under the direction of Michael Lienesch)
Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt and Herbert Marcuse are generally considered to be 
theorists quite distinct from one another.  In this paper, I argue that there are notable 
similarities in their work, particularly with regards to their social and political critique of 
modern, technological society.  Each of them emerged during World War II as social critics 
who attempted to trace the rise and success of totalitarian movements, while engaging with  
the most fundamental political issues of their times: collective action, the relationship of the 
individual to their society, and justice, among others. Using a selection of their most 
significant writings, I consider their views on freedom, rationality, and science and 
technology, along with their vision of politics, and emphasize their similar perspectives on 
these issues. I conclude with some deliberations about their core beliefs, and summarize the 
commitment of each to a post-totalitarian politics dedicated to the fulfillment of human 
potential.
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INTRODUCTION
Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt and Herbert Marcuse are not customarily grouped 
together as thinkers.   When reading them, it is their differences that are easily seen.   
Although all twentieth century thinkers, the authors write in different contexts and times.  
Weil’s The Need for Roots was written and published prior to the end of the second World 
War, at the height of fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. Arendt’s controversial The 
Origins of Totalitarianism  appeared during the 1950s, during the trials of Nazi war criminals 
and the beginning of American political dominance.  Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man was a 
product of the protest-laden 1960s. While all engaged in some way with Marx and Marxism, 
they wrote from different perspectives.  Weil has been analyzed as a Christian (Perrin and 
Thibon 2003; Hanratty 1997; Kerr and Mulder 1994), a mystic (Nava 2001), and a 
communitarian (Diogenes and Sprin 1994).  Arendt has been described primarily as a theorist 
of democracy (Henaff and Strong 2001; Knauer 1975).  Studies have concentrated on 
Arendt’s relationship with Heidegger (Young-Bruel 1998); her connections to the Jewish 
community (Ring 1997; Bernstein 1996; Felman 1978) and her problematic views on 
questions involving women (Pitkin 1998; Honig 1995).  For his part, Marcuse has been seen 
in different ways: as a radical thinker who inspired the student leaders and oppositional 
movements of the sixties (Kellner 1998; Cranston 1971); as a Marxist (Kellner 1984); as 
influenced by Freud and psychological theory (Vellilamthadam 1978; Boyers 1975; Lipshires 
1974; Robinson 1969).  Yet while each of these claims on these scholars is correct, there is 
2something to be gained—namely, a sharp tool for political critique—by highlighting their 
similarities, rather than their differences.  
On this point there has been surprisingly little scholarship.  There have been some 
treatments of Arendt and Weil together, notably Mary Dietz’s “The Slow Boring of Hard 
Boards” (1994) and Sylvie Courtine-Denamy’s book on Edith Stein, Arendt, and Weil 
(2000).  Arendt and Weil were also analyzed together in Andrea Nye’s Philsophia: The 
Thought of Rosa Luxembourg, Simone Weil and Hannah Arendt  (1994).  Arendt and 
Marcuse have been discussed together by Richard Wolin in Heidegger’s Children (1998).  It 
is remarkable that the connections between Arendt and Marcuse have not been more fully 
explored.  They were both connected to Walter Benjamin—Marcuse through his colleagues 
at the Frankfurt Institute, while Arendt met Benjamin in Paris after fleeing Germany.  They 
both left Germany in the same year, in fact—1933—and both made their way to the United 
States. They became influential academics in the United States, and died within one year of 
each other.  Nevertheless, there is little work describing the parallels between them.  As to 
treatments of all three theorists together, they are nonexistent.
But the similarities between these three thinkers are striking.  To begin, what I found 
were consistent subsidiary themes in their discussion of totalitarianism: a similar account of 
politics and human freedom, a similar critique of science and technology as applied in 
modern societies, and a similar hope for the redemption of rationality as an integral part of 
human life.  The bedrock upon which each thinker’s thought rests is a conception of politics 
that is human (and humane) and resistant to violence and might; a politics that is committed, 
above all, to human freedom.
3Freedom in their work is most often equated with struggle, uniqueness and the wholly 
new and unexpected.  It requires a shared understanding of history, a feeling of common 
cause, and knowledge of  particularity.  It does not occur in isolation, but relies on the 
presence of others.  From their experience with totalitarian regimes, they draw the lesson that 
people may imagine themselves to be free even when they are emphatically and empirically 
unfree.  Thus, they are all reliant on a conception of true freedom that is to be distinguished 
from the ability to choose between manufactured possibilities.  Their vision of freedom has 
to do with human development.  Under conditions of freedom, we could freely choose who 
we are, and what we will do.  Freedom contains the possibility of genesis, of new beginnings, 
and is the fulfillment of human creativity.
In their investigation of rationality, they each turn to questions of true and false 
consciousness and true and false needs, even, for that matter, true and false rationality.  
Industrial society, in their view, relies upon creating a false kind of rationality, one that 
makes rationality private and individual rather than public and collective.  True rationality 
would allow humans to achieve both intellectual and physical conditions of freedom; it 
would have human liberation and the good as its goal; it would rest upon the rational refusal 
of both economic behavior and means-ends thinking.  They question the possibility of 
rational action within a framework they consider to be irrational as a whole.
They all object to science as technocracy, science which does not advance humanity 
by freeing them but rather enslaves them further.  They object to what they see as the 
dehumanizing forces of technology expressed through labor that is ultimately repetitive and 
meaningless. They strongly object to the belief that science is or can be isolated from 
politics, and reject the idea that science occupies a place that stands apart from the common 
4world.  They see science as an abstraction from the world, rather than an engagement with 
the world, and they see the language of science as increasingly meaningless and elitist.  They 
would prefer to see science devoted to freeing men from necessity in order to free them for a 
political, creative, human life. Perhaps a useful distinction might be made: between the 
scientific enterprise as one method of investigation and inquiry, and scientism, the belief that 
there is only one valid way of gathering information and evidence.  What these three thinkers 
object to most is the second: the belief that all human activity can be studied and understood 
the same way that the movement of atoms and energy can.  This kind of belief leads to a 
conception of society and politics as no more than so many forces to be contained and 
manipulated: a technocratic understanding of human life.
In addition, they share a conception of politics as conflictual, public, and process-
oriented, one of the last human activities that reveals our true selves to one another.  It is a 
vision of politics as resistance, for they see modern society as largely a-, or anti-, political.  
Politics, in this view, is a work of art, a skill much like the composition and conducting of a 
symphony.  It is based on legitimate authority rather than might and violence.  It is based on 
a different conception of rationality, what Marcuse calls “reason rightly understood,” a 
rationality that is collective and communal and created between people, rather than an 
individualistic, means-ends, economic rationality.  For all that, they value the local and the 
particular, and the politics that is only possible among people in a cohesive community, and 
they also share a deep distrust of the human need for unity. 
Above all, these thinkers are oppositional thinkers in two ways.  First, they place 
themselves largely against the prevailing winds of public thought and preference, opposing 
what they see as the dangers and deficiencies of mass society. Secondly, in each of their 
5work they offer groups or concepts that are opposed to one another.  The use of opposed 
categories in their thought shapes their view of politics as being composed primarily of 
opposed groups and tendencies: there are those actions and beliefs which lead to human 
freedom, and those that lead away from human freedom, and very little in-between. Weil, the 
only Christian thinker of the three, is the most comfortable with dualistic statements of good 
and evil.  Her thought tends toward a black-and-white understanding of morality and 
goodness, and Arendt emphasizes the opposition of the political and the social, an opposition 
she brings from the Greeks and which colors her view of the social movements that are often 
what we mean when we think of a politics of resistance. Marcuse, in his turn, lauds such 
movements, as he saw them emerge in the late 1960s, and, indeed, influenced their course.  
Marcuse’s thought rests almost entirely upon dialectical relationships, relying upon negation 
and refusal as the primary path to human emancipation. 
As I work through each thinker, I will first touch upon their idea of freedom.  Then I 
will move through their critique of rationality, the practice of science in industrial society, 
and their conception of politics.  I hope to show that apparently different categories perform 
the same analytic work in each.
SIMONE WEIL AND ROOTED RATIONALITY
Simone Weil was born in Paris in 1909 to secular Jewish parents who raised both 
Simone and her brother Andre as agnostics.  Both children were highly intelligent; Andre 
Weil became one of the great mathematicians of the 20th century.   The two children invented 
a language that they used to speak to one another, and taught themselves advanced geometry 
and ancient Greek.  In other words, Simone Weil’s childhood was as extraordinary as her 
6life, and she never valued conformity.  She attended the Ecole Normale Superieur with 
Simone de Beauvoir.  After receiving her degree, she became a schoolteacher, and also 
worked for a time in the Renault factory and on farms.  This was highly unusual for a 
middle-class, well educated woman such as Weil, but it was an effort on her part to gain 
compassion for, and understand the plight of, the laboring classes.  Weil had a series of 
conversion experiences and became a devout, though unbaptized, Christian.  Displaced by 
World War II, she lived in London and wrote The Need for Roots while trying to return to 
France to become a member of the French Resistance. She was diagnosed with tuberculosis 
in 1943 and disregarded instructions as to rest and diet; she died in a sanatorium in Kent that 
same year.1  All her works were published posthumously, including The Need for Roots
(1952), as well as Gravity and Grace (1952) , Oppression and Liberty (1958), Waiting on 
God (1979).  Her collected notebooks were published in 1956, and a reader compiling her 
shorter essays in 1977. 
Freedom Through Community
Weil’s idea of freedom is distinct from conceptions of freedom as unlimited liberty, 
liberty without bounds other than (perhaps) the possibility of harming others.  Such 
unmitigated freedom is, interestingly enough, a totalitarian, not a liberating, tendency present 
in a society. Faced with too much choice, Weil believes that people will be paralyzed rather 
than liberated, and will seek relief from what they will see as a burden.2 She writes, “where 
the possibilities of choice are so wide as to injure the commonweal,” that is, where choosing 
1Though I must respectfully disagree with some analyses of Weil’s eating “disorder” (See for example Maitre 
2000, Kraus 2000). I believe that classifying her as an anorexic, as these scholars do, oversimplifies what Weil 
believed she was doing at the end of her life.
2
 Psychological experiments have validated this hypothesis.
7against the common good is possible, “men cease to enjoy liberty” (Weil, The Need for 
Roots, 12).  They cease to enjoy liberty, Weil suggests, because they cannot use their liberty 
to attain the things they truly wish to have: connectivity and history.  Weil believes that 
people desire to belong to a community that has both a past and a future, and that people 
wish to have knowledge of their place in that past and in that future.  Secondly, their liberty 
is of an illusory nature, and they are aware on some level that a choice between a thousand 
breakfast cereals is no choice at all.  Their liberty is unsatisfactory in all ways, and so they 
resent it.  Weil writes, “Under such circumstances,” of unmitigated choice, “men, believing, 
wrongly, that they are in possession of liberty, and feeling that they get no enjoyment out of 
it, end up by thinking liberty is not a good thing” (Weil, The Need for Roots, 13). Men given 
unlimited liberty will not know how to use it, and will, in the end, forsake it.
Here is one of Weil’s many oppositions: between men’s belief about liberty and the 
actual existence of liberty; between true and false freedom, for the freedom that men would 
easily forsake is no freedom at all.  Weil isn’t sure that men will always seek emancipation—
in fact, she distrusts this impulse toward freedom more than either Arendt or Marcuse—but 
she does believe that men should be taught what real freedom is, and how to use it.  It is the 
purpose of the human community to teach the proper uses of freedom.
 But freedom, for Weil, happens only within limits and frames, specifically, within 
hierarchy and ordered communities. This is so for two reasons: first, hierarchy establishes 
order, without which equality is meaningless.  Order provides a context that enables men to 
fulfill their duties.  It is a “texture of social relationships” which is such that “no one is 
compelled to violate imperative obligations to carry out other ones” (Weil, The Need for 
Roots, 10).  The primary obligations Weil means here are the respect one owes one’s 
8community and the responsibility and respect one has for other human beings.  An ordered 
society implies that one can fulfill both of these obligations, whereas in a totalitarian or 
anarchic society one may often be forced to choose between one’s community (be it a town 
or a nation-state) and one’s respect for the humanity of other men. Weil understands that a 
society without an established order is anarchic and therefore, though there may be a kind of 
equality in an anarchic state, there cannot be freedom.  
Hierarchy performs an educational function.  It instructs men in their proper roles, 
and represents a continuity that is larger than each individual.  A hierarchy that endures 
creates places and spaces that are both individual and collective:  individual, because 
individuals must occupy certain places within the hierarchy and collective, because they last 
longer than an individual’s lifespan and are acknowledged by the community. People become 
equal to others who have occupied in the past, and currently occupy, the same position in 
society that they do.  Hierarchy is a necessary complement to equality, for it is hierarchy that 
“bring[s] each one to fit himself morally into the place he occupies.” (Weil, The Need for 
Roots, 18). “Liberation” from rooted, human communities throws us into individualized 
lives, without recourse to a larger system of meaning.  This lends itself to totalitarianism, 
because then meaning, which is individuated, can always be contested and seen as relative.
Weil’s conception of rooted communities needs to be examined, as it is the primary 
category upon which her theory rests.  It is both part of her nostalgia for communities that 
have been destroyed and part of her normative desire to see such communities established 
once again. Hierarchy is but one part of these rooted, historic—and by historic she means 
those that have maintained and continue to express right relation to the past—communities.  
Whereas democracy is often conceived of as being without hierarchy of any kind, Weil feels 
9that hierarchy is a necessary complement to equality.  Weil’s standards for what constitutes a 
community are exacting and rely upon certain basic assumptions.  A person belongs to such a 
community, or has roots (for Weil, being rooted and belonging to a historic community are 
the same) “by virtue of his real, active and natural participation in the life of a community 
which preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the past and certain particular 
expectations for the future” (Weil, The Need for Roots, 41).
Like Arendt, Weil sees belonging to a political community as reliant upon action and 
participation.  She also sees this participation as “natural,” which is to say, as part of being 
human.  Further, such communities “preserve in living shape,” which means, for Weil, that 
they preserve the past in practice , through continued replication of roles and duties.  History 
is expressed through actions that replicate the actions of forebears, and thus is literally 
embodied in the action of each participant.  Action in concert with others expresses one’s 
place—in the community, in time, and in the world at large—and one’s identity.  Each rooted 
community is distinct and unique.  Weil invokes the language and imagery of art (similar to 
her view of politics as a symphony or composition):
When a really talented painter walks into a picture gallery, his own originality 
is thereby confirmed.  The same thing should apply to the various 
communities throughout the world and the different social environments 
(Weil, The Need for Roots, 41).
The rooted community is a narrator and navigator for its members. Society’s 
“supreme mission” toward the individual is “maintaining throughout the present the links 
with past and future” (Weil, The Need for Roots, 95).  Without this guide and narration, Weil 
believes people lose their ability to think critically.  Intelligence and rationality is for Weil 
embedded and rooted in communities that provide the structure necessary for both.
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Weil’s foundational oppositional category is between might and justice.3  In Weil’s 
view, the purpose of politics is justice and the struggle towards the good.  Politics must teach 
individuals the place they occupy morally, both in their own community and also in the 
course of history.  Weil has a vision of politics that is counter to the current conception of 
politics as ugly and corrupt.  In Weil’s view, politics can be “ensembles in which 
independent factors concur…so as to form a thing of beauty” (Weil, The Need for Roots, 10).  
In this conception, politics could be seen as a symphony, as the correct and harmonic 
arrangement of societal elements: for example, an educational system which produces the 
right kind of citizens, who have the kind of knowledge necessary for a government based on 
freedom and justice rather than coercion. 
Once men do not relate compassionately to one another, politics of might is 
inevitable, because a politics of compassion and justice is no longer possible.  The 
relationship between means and ends is inverted (The Simone Weil Reader, 31) and each man 
becomes a means, rather than an end in himself.  Becoming a means to an end makes a thing 
of man, as men who are subjected to might become things.  In her essay on the Iliad, Weil 
investigates the politics based on might; the kind of politics which, it is clear, she believes is 
the primary mode of politics today.  It is a politics that does not acknowledge the vicissitudes 
of fortune, one which believes that all things—and in a politics of might, human beings are 
emphatically things—can be bent to the human will.  
Progress in Weil’s view is thus a “transition to a state of human society in which 
people will not suffer from hunger” (Weil, The Need for Roots, 6).  For Weil, these needs 
encompass not only bodily needs, but also the needs of the soul, which she considers of equal 
3
 Though one could also say that it is between the human and the divine: between human tendencies to use 
might in place of justice and the divine, which definitionally (for Weil) is the just.
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importance.  A nourishing society offers nourishment to the body, but also nourishes the 
desire for the good that Weil feels is inherent in every human being, “a desire for good which 
is unique, unchanging and identical with itself for every man, from the cradle to the grave” 
(Weil, The Need for Roots, 11). A progressive politics rests on the distinction between true 
and false needs, and on a commitment to meeting those needs which are essential. Needs, 
unlike wants, are always limited in scope; though there can never be enough gold, one 
eventually has enough bread.  One’s hunger for money can never be satiated; one’s hunger 
for bread has an end in sight.  It is possible, indeed necessary, for a just society to provide 
enough bread.  It is impossible for a society of any kind to provide enough gold. 
Rooted Rationality
For Weil, rationality is not rote memorization of facts or the performance of 
economic cost-benefit calculations.  Like Marcuse and Arendt, Weil objects to treating 
mankind like economic man, and reducing rationality to mere maximization of utility.  Weil, 
being an ascetic herself, despises money and monetary concerns, which she feels creates a 
profound malaise.  Money “destroys human roots” because it makes gain man’s only motive, 
outweighing all other concerns “because the effort it demands of the mind is so very much 
less” (Weil, The Need for Roots, 42).  Calculating action based on monetary gain or loss 
requires only the most rudimentary mental effort.  Rationality is, ultimately, knowledge of 
the good, and knowledge of one’s relation to the good.  This is far from a simple cost-benefit 
calculation, and the mental effort it requires is therefore that much greater.  If one imagines 
that the primary dialectic Weil is describing is that of movement between good and evil, facts 
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devoid of context are meaningless.  One must also know “their true perspective relative to 
good and evil” (Weil, The Need for Roots, 222).
A rooted rationality begins with critical intelligence, which for Weil is grounded—
literally—in community.  Communities that offer continuity in time allow for the emergence 
of common sense, rationality that is created between citizens who share a common past and a 
common future.  Such communities teach men how to make judgments based on 
considerations such as justice, history and compassion rather than on simple means-ends 
calculations.  They teach men that what should be admired are “only those actions and lives 
through which shines the spirit of truth, justice and love” (Weil, The Need for Roots, 218).  
More than Marcuse, or even Arendt, Weil longs for the restoration of destroyed communities, 
which allowed people to have a right relation to the past, a relation which educated them to 
their place in the community and in time and which allowed them to fulfill their obligations 
without conflict.  Weil believes that the destruction of a city is “the greatest of griefs that can 
come among men” (Weil, The Simone Weil Reader, 178) and that such destruction is 
irrevocable.
Rooted rationality creates the ability to distinguish between true and false needs.  For 
Weil, true needs are the needs of the soul, which she enumerates in The Need for Roots: 
needs such as equality, order, and liberty.  Importantly, these needs are equivalent to, but 
predicated upon, the satisfaction of essential needs of the body.  Therefore, in order to meet 
the needs of the soul, there must be a certain freedom from necessity and from excessive 
concern with the needs of the body.4 Rationality for Weil also means knowing the good, not 
only what is good for the individual, but what is good for the community.  Without 
4
 As we shall see, Arendt makes a similar argument for freedom from necessity as a prerequisite to political 
freedom.
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communities which frame, narrate, and help individuals to navigate their uncertain lives, 
each individual is left with only her own fragile and fallible human consciousness, easy prey 
for totalitarian propaganda which promises to restore a mysterious irrational wholeness in the 
minds of men.  Weil writes:
Today, it is only belonging unconditionally to some brown, red or other 
totalitarian system which is able to give, as it were, a solid illusion of inward 
unity, which is why it constitutes such a strong temptation for so many 
distraught minds (Weil, The Need for Roots, 235).
One of the greatest dangers of modern industrial society is that imperfect history is 
replaced with perfect fiction, and one of the largest and most perfect fictions is the fictional 
community that is the nation-state.  Weil believes the nation-state to be an idol, a false god 
that people love because they have nothing else.  It is also the most visible sign of that 
malady of modernity, uprootedness.  This false love is dangerous because it lacks context and 
spirit, and also because it is not translated in the everyday lives of citizens.  The past is no 
longer preserved in living spirit, which is to say, in the living practices that manifest history.  
The nation-state becomes the primary thread in the narrative citizens have about their lives, 
but it is a narrative that ultimately, for Weil, fails, because it does not allow for citizens to 
fulfill their obligations both to each other and to humanity.
She sees totalitarianism as the end of distinction—between force and justice, and 
good and evil--because totalitarianism is based on might, which makes things out of men and 
subjects all men to whimsical violence.  This means, too, that good and evil collapse into 
one, or, rather, that it becomes impossible to distinguish between them, and to determine 
rightly what is good and what is evil.  A politics based on might—and Weil feels that this is 
nearly all of modern politics—allows might rather than morals to determine the good, and it 
preempts the compassion of one man for another.  A politics based on might ends the 
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distinction between masters and slaves, making all men simultaneously masters and slaves.  
This ends Hegel’s dialectic, and forecloses the possibility of overcoming.
This knowledge of the good is for Weil irrevocably rooted in the past.  The primary 
tragedy of our age is the destruction of the past through a politics based on might.  History is 
a work of art, the accumulated narrative of thousands of human lives, one of which is our 
own.  One of the greatest dangers of modern industrial society is that imperfect history is 
replaced with perfect fiction. 
Science and the Technological Transformation of Man
Weil is at once enamored with and distrustful of science as it is practiced in modern 
society.  For her, science now performs two primary functions: to confirm what philosophers 
have already acknowledged, and to create technology that ultimately uproots.  For the first, 
she gives as an example Niels Bohr’s discovery in quantum mechanics that the observer 
always affects the observed, “so that it is impossible to know a phenomenon as it would be if 
we were not observing it.”  She calls this an “obvious truth” which has “always been 
known.” (Weil, The Simone Weil Reader, 100). Bohr’s principle of complementarity is 
“nothing other than the old correlation of contraries which is basic in the thought of 
Heraclitus and Plato” (The Simone Weil Reader, 101).  From this, Weil seems to draw the 
questionable conclusion that philosophers have already conceptualized what is only now 
being “discovered” in physics: therefore philosophy is not shaped by scientific discovery.5
Underlying Weil’s critique of science is the idea that scientists are technocrats: that they are 
not committed to the truth per se, but rather to a mechanistic world-view advanced to 
consolidate their own power.  Beyond that, Weil believes that “there is not, strictly speaking, 
5
 To further explore: Weil could be condemning a false division between science and philosophy.  After all, in 
Greek society the two were not distinct from one another.  
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the possibility of anything new in philosophy” (ibid.).  If there is nothing new in philosophy, 
and if philosophers cannot learn from scientists, then scientific inquiry may as well stop; 
there is nothing to be gained from further investigation that cannot be learned as well from 
the ancients. Science as currently practiced is not directed toward what Weil believes to be 
the correct ends, for “the scientist does not use science in order to manage to see more clearly 
into his own thinking, but aims at discovering results that will go to swell the present volume 
of scientific knowledge” (The Simone Weil Reader, 30).  This knowledge is of questionable 
value, as it is pursued for its novelty and prestige alone, and not for the advancement of 
human reason.6
Such science is also removed from the everyday, linguistically based, experience of 
men.  It exists in a world of symbols, and the cohesiveness of science depends upon signs 
rather than meaning, on “ready-made phrases whose use is stretched beyond the meanings 
originally contained in them” and on “algebraic calculations.”  Such highly symbolized 
investigation of the world is “blind” and leads to “pseudo-ideas,” the content of which is “no 
more than that of relations between signs” (The Simone Weil Reader, 29-30).
Further, from her experience in the Renault factory, in which she witnessed the mind-
numbing and repetitive nature of factory work, she believes that men are increasingly coming 
to shape themselves to their tools, rather than tools shaping themselves to men.  Homo 
faber—he who makes—becomes, instead, he-who-is-made.  Men come to serve machines, 
rather than machines serving men: “Machines do not run in order to enable men to live, but 
6
 It should be noted that Weil does not place a high premium on intelligence: when speaking of Plato’s Allegory 
of the Cave she said, “The difference between more or less intelligent men is like the difference between 
criminals condemned to life imprisonment in smaller or larger cells. The intelligent man who is proud of his 
intelligence is like a condemned man who is proud of his large cell…A village idiot is as close to truth as a 
child prodigy. ..." (Weil, Gravity and Grace, 52).  And yet, as we shall see in the next paragraph, Weil wants 
men to be more than machines, to use their intelligence to direct their activity to certain ends, not to be like 
blind forces.
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we resign ourselves to feeding men in order that they may serve the machines” (The Simone 
Weil Reader, 30-31). Weil sees this as a perversion of the natural productive capacity of men.  
It is a violence done to them, distancing them from their humanity.   Making men like 
machines in turn makes them into forces of nature, blind, irrational, force without 
intelligence.  Like Arendt, Weil sees labor as natural and essential to man, particularly 
physical labor, which she defines as the “spiritual core” of a “well-ordered social life” (Weil, 
The Need for Roots, 288).  The rise of technology strips men of their capacity for labor.  
Politics as Compassion
Might “makes a thing of anybody who comes under its sway” and, in the extreme, 
“makes a thing of man in the most literal sense, for it makes him a corpse” (The Simone Weil 
Reader, 154).  Men who have weapons continually trained upon them—as all men now do, 
whether they acknowledge it or not—are naked before might, and are a corpse before they 
are even touched (155).  They are dehumanized by fear.  It may be that they are killed, but it 
may be that they suffer a worse fate, “without dying, [they] have become things for the rest 
of their lives” (157).  They are enslaved by might, stripped of their power to decide.  They 
cannot even be faithful to their city.  They lose “all inner life” (159).  They become, in 
essence, one-dimensional, though of course Weil does not use this term.  The only hope for 
such de-humanized people comes if there is “an opportunity to change [their] destiny” 
(161)—assuming that they have the capacity to recognize such an opportunity.
This politics of might, however, also strangely ends the distinction between master 
and slave.  The human race is not so divided, between the “suppliants on one hand, and 
conquerors and masters on the other” for “no single man is to be found in it who is not, at 
some time, forced to bow beneath might” (161).  Those who are powerful always over-reach, 
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and are then subjected to might themselves (165); Weil gives the example of Hector and 
Achilles, who each play the role both victor and vanquished. The politics of might is 
therefore an endless cycle, a movement of retribution, movement between being master and 
being slave.  This violent movement crushes all, those who appear for a time to wield it, 
those who receive it, “for violence so crushes whomever it touches that it appears at last 
external no less to him who dispenses it than to him who endures it” (167).  Man becomes a 
tool, used by forces beyond his control, and both victor and vanquished, though they may not 
know it, are equally subject, equally object.
Might is without justice, and without justice, there is no politics.  Might cannot 
understand suffering, and it does not believe in chance, and the acknowledgement and 
understanding of both are necessary for the existence of politics.  Weil states this in 
epigrammatic fashion: “the understanding of human suffering is dependent upon justice, and 
love is its condition” (181).  Necessity and fate make us equal, for we will all suffer under 
both: “Whoever does not know just how far necessity and a fickle fortune hold the human 
soul under their dominion cannot treat as his equals, nor love as himself, those whom chance 
has separated from him by an abyss” (181).
Turning away from a politics of might, a politics that is inevitably one -dimensional 
and objectifying, requires a radical humility.  It also requires that one know the empire of 
might, and that one respect love—that is, compassion for one’s fellow human beings, one’s 
fellow sufferers—more than one respects violence.  Violence springs from “pride, 
humiliation, hate, disdain, indifference, the wish to forget or to ignore” but a politics arrayed 
against might would acknowledge “the relations between the human soul and destiny” the 
degree to which “any and every soul is transformed by pitiless necessity” (181).  Weil 
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proposes, in the face of a totalitarianism that promises the irrelevance of fortune, that men 
remember “that nothing is sheltered from fate, how never to admire might, or hate the enemy, 
or despise sufferers” (183).  Such compassion is the cornerstone of Weil’s rooted rationality.
HANNAH ARENDT AND RATIONAL ACTION
Hannah Arendt was born in Germany in 1906 to secular Jewish parents.  In 1923 she 
began her studies at the University of Berlin; in 1924 she entered Marburg University, where 
she worked—and, in time, began a romantic relationship with—Martin Heidegger.7  Arendt 
wrote her dissertation--on the concept of love in the thought of St. Augustine—in 1929, but, 
as a Jew, was prevented from completing her habilitation.  In 1933 she left Germany for 
Paris, where she befriended Walter Benjamin and attended Alexader Kojeve’s lectures on 
Hegel. She immigrated to the United States in 1941, and in 1959 became the first woman 
appointed to a full professorship at Princeton.  She died in 1978.  Among her many published 
works are: The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951); The Human Condition (1958); Between 
Past and Future (1961); On Revolution (1963) and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the 
Banality of Evil (1963).
Freedom as Praxis
One of Arendt’s primary oppositions is between the social and the political.  Freedom 
for Arendt, following Aristotle, means “full independencies of the necessities of life and the 
7 I do not know whether Arendt and Marcuse met in Germany or not; she had seemingly left Heidegger’s circle 
when Marcuse joined it (he began attending Heidegger’s lectures in 1928).  Arendt and Marcuse’s lives are 
interestingly parallel, and a cursory examination has not revealed when or if they connected as scholars and 
exiles in the United States.  It would be interesting to examine the disparate development of these two scholars 
as a reaction against Heidegger.  They take very different paths, and yet retain very similar categories of 
critique. 
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relationships they originate” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 12).  By this, Arendt means a 
minimal freedom from necessity, a definition of freedom that “excluded everybody who 
involuntarily or voluntarily, for his whole life or temporarily, had lost the free disposition of 
his movements and activities” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 12).  Thus, many citizens 
currently considered free are not at all free, for they must labor for necessities and lack the 
free movement and activity that is the definition of a citizen.  To be free means “neither to 
rule nor be ruled” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 32), either by others or by necessity.
Like Weil, Arendt was deeply enamored of the ancient Greeks, and much of her work 
is shaped by the ideal of freedom through political action.  In Arendt’s thought, the political 
is distinct and separate from the concerns of everyday life.  It is where men8 make manifest 
their dedication to the common good.  A life chosen in freedom will  “[be] concerned with 
the ‘beautiful,’ that is, with things neither necessary nor merely useful” (Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 13).  This definition leads to Arendt’s oft-criticized division between the political 
and the social.  For Arendt, freedom is dependent on the absence of human (that is, personal) 
wants and needs.  The political is not, therefore, meant to address these questions of 
necessity, which should be confined to the family and the realm of the social rather than the 
realm of the political.  She credits (or blames) Thomas Aquinas for confusing the two realms, 
and notes that “this unconscious substitution of the social for the political betrays the extent 
to which the original Greek understanding of politics had been lost” (Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 23).
8 It seems inappropriate to make this a gender-neutral term.  While Arendt was surely, as a woman, in favor of 
women’s participation in the political, her division of the social and the political, and the privileged position she 
gives the political, seems to relegate many issues related to women’s political participation to that murky 
“social” realm she so despises.  Arendt seems to believe that women can be included in the political as simply 
an expansion of franchise, and that women will behave no differently and have no different needs than men do 
in the political realm.
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The confusing of the social with the political creates inequality.  Bringing social 
concerns into the realm of the political collapses the distinction between household and polis, 
and opens up the possibility of patriarchal, paternal politics at every level of society.  Arendt 
is identifying this collapse of the social into the political as a kind of uprootedness, an end to 
both the family and the polis.  She writes, “the emergence of the social realm, which is 
neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin 
coincided with the emergence of the modern age and which found its political form in the 
nation state” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 28).  This collapsing of two separate spheres 
into one creates a situation in which politics is no longer seen as a meaningful or heroic 
human action.
The family declines and is absorbed into different social groups (Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 40).  The nation-state, for both Arendt and Weil, indicates an absence rather than 
a presence.  The nation-state emerges to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of classes, 
structure and hierarchy.  For both, the nation-state is a pale imitation: of community, of 
authority, of politics, since the loyalty men give to the state is qualitatively less than that 
which they would give to a polis.  Both theorists see the modern patriotism as servility and 
self-abnegation, rather than as legitimate loyalty and obedience to a greater good. What 
Arendt wants is what Weil and Marcuse want, simply, “nothing more than to think what we 
are doing” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 5). (It is difficult to read Arendt and Weil and not 
see that they ascribe virtue to the traits they themselves have: exceptional intelligence, a 
scholarly, upper middle-class background, and a high degree of education.)  By “think[ing] 
of what we are doing” Arendt is asking for two things: a rational consideration of being and 
action, and a consideration of the relation of that action to the common good.
21
Arendt, like Weil, believes that hierarchy and structure is necessary for freedom.  It is 
the aristocracy—meaning, those who are free from necessity—who advance societies, and 
Arendt mourns the lack of “an aristocracy of either a political or spiritual nature” from which 
“a restoration of the other capacities of men could start anew” (Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 5).  Even those who achieve high position in society view what they do as a “job,” 
a means of earning a living, rather than as a part of a larger, human and political enterprise. 
Classes (as opposed to masses) bind people to the whole. Like Weil’s conception of 
hierarchy, classes relate people to one another, and to the past and the future.  They create 
what Arendt refers to as the literal meaning of “inter-est”: that which lies between people, 
“and therefore can relate and bind them together” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 182).  
Without classes, no man is related to the whole, and he is incapable of knowing the position 
that he occupies in society. This makes him inherently egotistical, bound in with his own 
self-interest, which is untethered by a class or community interest.
Intersubjective Rationality
For Arendt, nature is understandable only as it stands in silent contrast to the man-
made world: “against the subjectivity of man stands the objectivity of the man-made world, 
rather than the sublime indifference of untouched nature” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 
137). Any time man lives entirely in man-made conditions, “neither labor nor work nor 
action, nor, indeed, thought as we know it would then make sense any longer” (Arendt, The 
Human Condition, 10). In this view, rationality is irreducibly earth- bound and conditioned by 
the natural world.  Science, which espouses an Archimedean standpoint, a universal 
standpoint that is outside the earth, makes Arendt uneasy, because it removes the possibility 
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of understanding rationality as intersubjective.9  Unlike Weil, who feels that there are 
obligations owed to each individual human being simply because they are human beings, 
Arendt does not want universal categories, or universal viewpoints.  She sees human, located 
and specific viewpoints as those that can be used to make us intelligible to one another.  
Arendt, who values our capacity to say what is, cannot look for liberation in a discipline 
(such as she believes modern physics is) which says that what we see is contingent, that what 
is is not always what appears to be, and that we cannot trust the evidence of our own senses.  
In all three thinkers there is a dislike and distrust of modern physics, which denies the 
physical, sensual reality of the world, and which is understandable only in a highly symbolic, 
specialized language.  
Rather than the fictional world of totalitarianism, Arendt offers the possibility of 
saying what is, asserting that “no human world destined to outlast the short span of mortals 
within it will ever be able to survive without men willing to do what Herodotus was the first 
to undertake consciously, namely…to say what is.  No permanence, no perseverance in 
existence, can ever be conceived of without men willing to testify to what is and appears to 
them because it is.” 
For Arendt, speech itself can constitute a heroic action.  Saying what is is a public act 
of genesis, the beginning of a deliberate process of community creation.  “What makes mass 
society so difficult to bear,” she writes, “is not the number of people involved, but the fact 
that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to 
separate them” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 52-53). Arendt compares interest to a table 
that is between us, which seems to separate us, but which actually connects us through shared 
9 Though many scientists would disagree, citing the public and contested nature of their investigations.
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meaning.  Without the table, we are merely individuals sitting by ourselves, rather than 
gathered around a common object. Our rationality is what makes us human, and our 
rationality must be created in action, in between us all.  Rationality is, above all, a question 
of relation and relationship, the right and meaningful relation of one citizen to another.  
Rationality is part of the common world, which transcends our lifespan, extending into the 
past and the future; it is “what we have in common not only with those who live with us, but 
also with those who were here before and will come after us” (Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 55).
In a mass society in which people are unknown to one another, “the liar is free to 
fashion his ‘facts’ to fit the profit and pleasure, or even the mere expectations of his 
audience” and, because of this fluidity, “the chances are that he will be more persuasive than 
the truthteller” (Arendt, Between Past and Future, 53). This is above all a violent move, a 
violence that is done internally and is all the more dangerous because of it.  It offers a false 
wholeness, pretending to tell a story that cannot be told, promising resolution to fractured 
consciousness. Moderns are above all atomized and individuated; again, rationality becomes 
privatized, something seen as individual.  Authority, rather than being present in classes and 
hierarchy, devolves to the individual, meaning that there is no authority at all.
Science as Force
It is the mass- ification of society that allows for the scientific study of the behavior of 
men, which Arendt distrusts.  Economics, Arendt believes, “could achieve a scientific 
character only when men had become social beings and unanimously followed certain 
patterns of behavior so that those who did not keep the rules could be considered to be 
abnormal or asocial” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 41). This statistical uniformity, this 
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reliance on mass behavior rather than meaningful action, is part of the increasingly 
individuated isolation of organized society.  Meaningful action requires the presence of 
others who see what we see and hear what we hear, which “assures us of the reality of the 
world and of ourselves” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 50). Statistical uniformity can no 
longer be considered a harmless scientific ideal, but “is the no longer secret political ideal of 
a society which, entirely submerged in the routine of everyday living, is at peace with the 
scientific outlook inherent in its very existence” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 43).
In the view of these three thinkers, science as applied and used in modern industrial 
societies has tended toward destruction rather than production.  The question of science is a 
political question, and what happens in the sciences is of great political significance, because 
within the (algebraic10) study of science, speech becomes irrelevant, and speech is what 
makes us political beings.  Arendt believes the language of science to be dangerous because 
it is without intersubjectively created meaning, “for the sciences today have been forced to 
adopt a ‘language’ of mathematical symbols which…now contain statements that cannot be 
translated back into speech.”  Scientific experts, whose opinion is highly valued, cannot be 
adequate guides or leaders in a society because “they move in a world where speech has lost 
its power” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 3-4).
Labor, which Arendt considers a quintessentially human activity, is reduced and 
ultimately eliminated by technology, but to our detriment, for “this society does no longer 
know of those other higher and more meaningful activities for the sake of which this freedom 
[from labor] would deserve to be won” (Arendt, The Human Condition,5).  Automation does 
not free us, but strips us of our “oldest and most natural burden, the burden of laboring” 
10 Both Weil and Arendt insist that it is the algebraic approach to the sciences that has removed the content 
from them.
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(Arendt, The Human Condition, 4).  Men do not use their tools but become tools themselves, 
extensions of the automation and subject to its will.  Arendt contrasts this to “the tools of 
workmanship, which at every given moment in the work process remain the servants of the 
hand, the machines demand that the laborer serve them, that he adjust the natural rhythm of 
his body to their mechanical movement…as long as the work of the machine lasts, the 
mechanical process has replaced the rhythm of the human body” (Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 124). Machines force the human body into “an infinitely quicker rhythm of 
repetition than the cycle of natural processes prescribed” (Arendt, The Human Condition,
125).
Technology does not free people from necessity, but redefines necessity, first by 
“hid[ing] it [necessity] from our senses” (Arendt The Human Condition, 125).  To free man 
from necessity, for Arendt, requires more than merely the production of abundance.  In fact, 
the unthinking, unceasing production that creates abundance—or what passes for it—also 
creates unthinking, unceasing consumption (Arendt, The Human Condition, 126).  In 
Arendt’s view, we have shifted from the ideals of homo faber—permanence, stability, and 
durability—to the ideal of animal laborans, mere abundance.  All human activity has been 
leveled, reduced to securing the necessities of life.  It’s a beggar’s dream come true, “the age-
old dream of the poor and destitute, which can have a charm of its own so long as it is a 
dream, but turns into a fool’s paradise as soon as it is realized” (Arendt The Human 
Condition, 133).  The spare time that should have materialized to allow people to fish in the 
morning, paint in the evening, and so forth, has instead merely given the laborer time to 
spend consuming.  It’s important to note that there is an unstated tension here.  Arendt is 
making a distinction between the forms of labor that most humans have participated in up 
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until the industrial age and the seemingly new form of labor (mechanized labor) to which she 
objects.  This suggests that Arendt considers the toil of agricultural labor to be less 
dehumanizing than factory labor.  Agricultural labor allows people to remain in touch with 
the rhythms of nature in a way that labor subjected to the whims of machinery does not—but 
this does not negate the fact that agricultural labor was a drudgery from which most people 
were glad to escape.
In a world dominated by masses instead of classes, “behavior” replaces action.  
Rather than attempting to achieve immortality through great deeds, men will believe that 
“deeds will have less and less chance to stem the tide of behavior, and events will more and 
more lose their significance, that is, their capacity to illuminate historical time” (Arendt, The 
Human Condition 43).  It is action that contains the possibility of immortality in a way that 
mere behavior does not.  Action is purposive, with an eye toward history and one’s place 
within both history and one’s political community.  Behavior is merely reactive, non-
liberatory.  It is behaving in a certain way mindlessly—that is, without thought of the past or 
the future.
Politics As Action
Like the Greeks she esteems so highly, Arendt sees in political activity a truly and 
uniquely human activity:
man’s capacity for immortal deed distinguishes him from animals; a man who seeks 
immortal fame rather than mortal things is the truly human man, distinguished from 
men who are content with whatever pleasures nature will yield them and who thus 
‘live and die like animals’ (Arendt, The Human Condition, 19).
This activity, politics, is both that which is concerned with something larger than ourselves—
our human community, its history and its future—and is also the way we make ourselves 
27
manifest to one another, through meaningful speech.  It is how we distinguish ourselves, 
from one another and from animals.  “Natural” or apolitical speech would be that speech that 
reveals nothing about the speaker herself.  Scientific and mathematical language could be 
considered this kind of non-revelatory, apolitical speech.
Arendt doubts that there is any liberatory possibility in science and technology, which 
she feels always lack meaningful speech.  The sciences trouble Arendt, for she believes “the 
‘truths’ of the modern scientific view…will no longer lend themselves to normal expression 
in speech and thought” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 3).  Speech and action are, in 
Arendt’s thought, inevitably intertwined: “with word and deed we insert ourselves into the 
human world” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 176); “No other human performance requires 
speech to the same extent as action” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 179).  Speech without 
action may be communicative, but it is not political and thus is not fully human—that is, not 
reflecting a human’s highest capacity.
Thus, a language that is entirely symbolic and which transmits neither meaning nor 
action is a language that is eviscerated, stripped of its primary purpose.  Scientific language,
expressed through symbols, is mute, and “only sheer violence is mute” (Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 26).  Science in this view can only be violent or lead to violence.  Rather than use 
speech to persuade, it commands by force, by technology, and to command rather than 
persuade is prepolitical.  Force is an indicator of inequality. (Arendt The Human Condition,
26-27).  Further, science has led to automation that has destroyed action even beyond these 
considerations of speech.  
The techonolgies that men believe will make them free, by allowing them the time to 
engage in chosen, purposive acitivies, instead entraps them in a never-ending cycle of 
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necessity. As befitting someone who believes our actions shape our selves and our narratives 
about ourselves, Arendt believes that our tools shape us.  She writes, “the things that owe 
their existence exclusively to men nevertheless constantly condition their human makers” 
(Arendt, The Human Condition, 9).  The normative implication here is that the tools people 
use should be consciously chosen. This is a choice that is not given to laborers, who must use 
whatever technology is deemed necessary for profit, rather than that whichc is necessary for 
politics. Arendt feels that this enslaves them to constant motion, labor without meaning, 
process without end, and without the possibility of making themselves manifest through their 
action. 
HERBERT MARCUSE AND RATIONAL RESISTANCE
Herbert Marcuse was born in Berlin in 1898 into a secular Jewish family.  He 
completed his dissertation at the University of Freiburg in 1922, and returned in 1929 to 
write his habilitation with Martin Heidegger.  In 1933, like Arendt, he found he could not 
complete his habilitation under the Nazi regime.  He joined the Frankfurt Institute for Social 
Research that year and immigrated to the United States.  He began teaching in 1952 and 
taught at Columbia, Harvard and Brandeis, finally moving to the University of California at 
San Diego.  Throughout his life he remained politically involved and frequently gave 
speeches throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  He died in 1979.  During his life, he published 
extensively, including Reason and Revolution (1941), Eros and Civilization (1955), One-
Dimensional Man (1964), Negations (1968), An Essay on Liberation (1969), and Counter-
Revolution and Revolt (1972).
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Freedom Through Opposition
Opposition itself is the foundational notion of Marcuse’s thought: negation, resistance 
and the Great Refusal.  One-Dimensional Man bears the marks of its time—published last, 
and influenced by and influencing 60’s counter-cultural movements.  Marcuse offers a 
detailed description of the freedom he considers not only possible, but also absolutely 
necessary, for the progress and development of mankind.  True freedom requires both 
intellectual and physical freedom—freedom of the mind and freedom of the body—and it is 
irreducibly political .  Marcuse sounds like Arendt when he says that it is “the political 
universe in which, alone, freedom can be attained” (Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, 
50) and that “political freedom would mean liberation of the individuals from politics over 
which they have no effective control” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 4).  Freedom is, for 
Marcuse, self-directed self-development, self-development that “presupposes free available 
energy which is not expended in super-imposed material and intellectual labor” (Marcuse, 
One-Dimensional Man, 243).  In increasingly one-dimensional societies, freedom is mainly 
manifested in and through opposition.  Opposition reveals the irrationality upon which 
organized societies rest, and “to the degree to which the established society is irrational, the 
consciousness becomes free for the higher historical rationality only in the struggle against 
the established [rationality]” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 222). 
Like Arendt, Marcuse sees that the primary violence done to those living in 
totalitarian regimes is internal violence, violence done to conscience and consciousness.  A 
uni-dimensional society, a society without opposition, produces men who are incapable of 
resistance, or, worse, who are unwilling to resist, who see no need of it. Marcuse 
acknowledges that people may not know they are unfree, that, in fact, “under the conditions 
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of a rising standard of living, non-conformity with the system itself appears to be socially 
useless, and the more so when it entails tangible economic and political disadvantages and 
threatens the smooth operation of the whole” (Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 2). 
Marcuse assumes that people want to be free, even if they do not know they are 
unfree.  One-Dimensional Man is thus an attempt to correct consciousness and awaken 
conscience.  One-Dimensional Man, in particular among Marcuse’s works, is imbued 
throughout with a distinction between true and false consciousness.  In the preface, Marcuse 
is unrestrained in his desire to show the way, for he feels that “men must come to see it [the 
inherent irrationality of existing society] and find their way from false to true consciousness, 
from their immediate to their real interest” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, xlv).  Further, 
the only way to change consciousness is to change the material circumstances of men’s 
existence, to change their way of life, which in Marcuse’s view only happens through 
denying the positive, through refusing what is offered (ibid.).  It is not only the “given” we 
need to see, but also the “hidden,” (Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, 71) not only 
what is, but what is lacking; not only the sun, but also the shadow.  This is the beginning of 
reshaping consciousness: to first refuse, to critically examine all that is offered, rather than 
accepting it unthinkingly.11  It is not the only action, but it is the essential action.
Marcuse’s conception of false consciousness is what he calls “enslaving 
contentment.” He recognizes that many people seem to live reasonably happy lives under a 
system he considers reprehensible and thoroughly destructive.  People seeking 
“comfort…and job security” in a society which is simultaneously preparing itself for—
through its defense industry--and against—also through its defense industry—nuclear 
annihilation is “an example of enslaving contentment” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 
11
 Like a 12-step program for addicts of organized society.
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243). It is impossible, to him, that a person of good conscience could be content under a 
system based entirely on waste and injustice.  He therefore has to see them as tricked, fooled, 
bound.  All of our social organization, from our modes of transport to the way we get and 
consume our food, “bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers, and, 
through the latter, to the whole” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 12).  Again, the criticism 
Marcuse is making here is dependent upon a distinction between true and false 
consciousness, and true and false needs.  False needs are those that perpetuate toil, 
aggressiveness, and misery: in short, those needs that are based on artificial scarcity and 
zero-sum games.  The fulfillment of these false needs, Marcuse admits, may be gratifying, 
but the end result is “euphoria in unhappiness” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 4-5).  
These needs are, ultimately, unreasonable, for they perpetuate the very state of existence that 
people are purportedly trying to avoid: that is, the state of unfreedom.  
Rational Resistance
Reason in Marcuse’s thought is always dialectical and oppositional, discovered 
through conflict and contestation.  It begins with considered refusal and contradiction, the 
possibility that what one has been told may not be what is so (Marcuse, One-Dimensional 
Man, xiv).  This implies that reason is always public and communally created.  It cannot 
stand on its own, nor does it exist without the referent that others provide.  The dialectic 
illuminates through opposition, and can often and most powerfully show what is lacking.  
What is, for Marcuse, is always shaped by what is not.  Negation does not always present an 
alternative vision of society, but—especially in a situation of increasing uni-
dimensionality—the power of negation may lie most of all in its ability to show that which is 
not there.
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Marcuse feels that reason has yet to be discovered, for reason properly understood 
would always lead toward greater human freedom.  True rationality is the pursuit of 
knowledge with human liberation as its end, and by human liberation Marcuse means both 
the intellectual and physical conditions of freedom. It is in his discussion of rationality that 
Hegel and Marx come through Marcuse’s writing most clearly.  First, there is clearly a 
dialectical component to reasoning and rationality, one which requires the presence of 
opposition and contestation.  Second, Marcuse follows Marx in assuming that the productive 
capacities developed by man may be used for more reasonable, rational ends—namely, 
towards human liberation, rather than toward mere consumption.
Rationality is, for Marcuse, reason rightly understood: reason directed toward the end 
of human liberation, freedom from necessity and from unnecessary, alienated labor.  Of the 
existing uses of reason, he writes, “Reason as thus far conceived has served to repress and 
deform the urge to live well.  Therefore reason itself is yet to be discovered” (Marcuse, One 
Dimensional Man, 228).  Although a dialectical thinker, he must deny the possibility of the 
end of the dialectic, that is, the culmination of reason that Hegel anticipated.  Or, more 
precisely, he must bring judgment to bear on the end of the dialectic: it will either be 
totalitarian or utopian, but Marcuse will know which it is by its ends.  Either it will be 
directed toward human liberation (utopia) or toward further enslaving contentment 
(totalitarianism).
In tracing the development of the concept of reason, Marcuse reaches back first to the 
classical exploration of logic and rationality.  Philosophy, he claims, began with two value 
judgments: “that freedom from toil is preferable to toil, and an intelligent life is preferable to 
a stupid life” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 126).  The ancients believed (and Weil, 
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Arendt and Marcuse each, in slightly different ways, agree) that to lead a truly human 
existence required that one be free from necessity.  Though modern people may see 
themselves as free from the kind of necessity that ruled the lives of the Greeks (namely, 
agricultural necessity), Marcuse notes that society still is organized so that “procuring the 
necessities of life constitutes the full-time and life-long occupation of specific social classes, 
which are therefore unfree and prevented from human existence.  In this sense, the classical 
proposition according to which truth is incompatible with enslavement by socially necessary 
labor is still valid” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 129. Emphasis in the original).
When Marcuse discusses rationality, he is often explicitly discussing truth, which, in 
the classical view, can be apprehended through reason.  Truth is subversive.  The fact that the 
apprehension of truth is limited to those who can spend their lives in contemplation means 
that the truth has never attained universality. When describing the dialogic apprehension of 
truth, Marcuse illustrates the movement between the sensual, observed world and the 
imagined ideal, the purely conceptual or abstract.  In the Platonic dialogues, there is 
movement and contestation.  The meanings of terms are kept open and ambiguous, and the 
dialogues develop from simple propositions.  In this dialogue, the “partner is led to question 
the normally unquestioned universe of experience and speech, and enter a new dimension of 
discourse…he is supposed to go beyond that which is given to him…” (Marcuse, One 
Dimensional Man, 131).  A Socratic discourse is a political discourse insofar as it 
“contradicts the established political institutions” (Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 154)—in 
other words, as long as it corrupts the youth.
Dialectical logic cannot be formal—that is, cannot be fixed, unchanging—because it 
is determined by the real.  The real has a certain rationality, the “rationality of contradiction, 
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of the opposition of forces, tendencies, elements, which constitutes the movement of the real, 
and if comprehended, the concept of the real” (Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 141).  Truth 
cannot be apprehended through the denial of what exists.  For Marcuse, the truth is not 
abstract.  It is the product of a dialogue between a questioning, rational mind and the world 
itself.
Although he believes in the potential of mind to apprehend truth, Marcuse is 
nonetheless deeply concerned with the limits of rationality.  He conceives of a future in 
which certain behaviors and thoughts become unimaginable, in which there is a “totalitarian 
logic of accomplished facts” and “the movement of thought is stopped at barriers which 
appear as the limits of Reason itself” (One-Dimensional Man, 14-15).  It is a “self-limitation 
of throught” which grows from a society in which certain oppositional behavior is barred and 
thus “the concepts pertaining to them are rendered illusory or meaningless” (One-
Dimensional Man, 15).
Marcuse also focuses on questions of “behavior.”  It is behavior which can be 
modified, controlled, statistically analyzed.  In other words, our “rational choices” are neither 
rational, nor freely chosen, and thus what we call “Reason” serves the powers that be (One-
Dimensional Man, 15-16).  This is a clear parallel to Arendt’s discussion of the mass-
ification of society which allows for people’s behavior to be categorized, analyzed, and 
ultimately, controlled.  People behave.  They can no longer act, because action implies 
knowable ends.
Our superficially rational actions serve irrational goals.  Our society is, Marcuse feels, 
irrational as a whole, “its productivity is destructive of the free development of human needs 
and faculties, its peace maintained by constant threat of war, its growth dependent on the 
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repression of the real possibilities for pacifying the struggle for existence” (Marcuse, One-
Dimensional Man, xli).  The minimal definition of rationality that is commonly used is 
economic rationality, which relies on individual cost-benefit, means-ends calculations.  Like 
Marx, Marcuse sees that this commodifies all of our relations to one another.  Economic 
rationality is a liberal construct that privatizes freedom, and allows each individual to believe 
they are free even if others are not.  In this calculus, “theoretical and practical Reason, 
academic and social behaviorism meet on common ground: that of an advanced society 
which makes scientific and technical progress into an instrument of domination” (One-
Dimensional Man, 16).
Science as Domination
Science is an exemplar of the larger irrationality of society.  It is directed toward the 
conquest of nature, which is the conquest of man: thus science leads to what Weil would 
consider a politics of might, and what Arendt would consider a politics of violence.  
Technology, which is science applied, makes automatons of men, and the machine becomes 
an efficient instrument of domination. It is an extraordinary instrument of domination, for it 
bends both the administrators and those who are administered to its form and function.  
Machines in Marcuse’s thought are like might in Weil’s thought and violence in Arendt’s 
thought, for they turn people into things.  Rather than people having the capacity for action, 
they are acted upon, in a way, by machines that dictate their movements and organize their 
labor.  What is interesting about this relationship (between man and machine) is that it closes 
the dialectic.  It does so because it fundamentally alters the relationship between Master and 
Slave, which is the original exemplar, in Hegel’s work, of the dialectic.  Can man go beyond 
the machine?  Is there a possibility of overcoming such a relationship? 
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Alexander Kojeve, in his discussion of the Master/Slave dialectic, stated that “human, 
historical, self-conscious existence is possible only where there are, or—at least—where 
there have been, bloody fights, wars for prestige” (O’Neill 51).  A machine does not 
consciously seek dominance or recognition, but nonetheless bends the will and lives of men 
to it.  “history stops at the moment when the difference, the opposition, between master and 
slave disappears” (O’Neill 53).  There is no overcoming of the machine—the machine has no 
will to fight to the death and yet still dominates the lives and labor of men.
Science, pursued rationally as Marcuse would have it, would recognize that it is a 
political pursuit, would entail “recognizing scientific consciousness as political 
consciousness, and the scientific enterprise as political enterprise” (Marcuse, One-
Dimensional Man, 233). The knowledge we currently pursue through the sciences is thus not 
the knowledge that will tend toward our freedom.  It tends instead towards waste and 
destructivity of human potential.  Our pursuit of knowledge enslaves us rather than freeing 
us.  It creates a false contentment, what Marcuse calls an ‘enslaving contentment.’  This 
enslaving contentment is one of the most dangerous illusions moderns have, and is the 
definition of false consciousness.
Though Marcuse disagrees with the ends toward which science is directed, he 
believes that they can be redirected in line with reason.  Science as practiced, in a society that 
is irrational as a whole, must be similarly irrational.  Science correctly practiced, that is, 
directed toward human liberation rather than human destruction, would aid in the fulfillment 
of reason.  This is the “evolution of the prevailing sciences” which would involve “scientific 
rationality as a whole, which has thus far been committed to an unfree existence and which 
would mean a new idea of science, of Reason” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 231).  
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What Marcuse is prescribing here is no small task: nothing short of the re-evaluation of two 
thousand years of research.  The study of quantum physics, for example, does not seem 
directly related to human happiness or liberation.  In fact, Arendt, Weil and Marcuse distrust 
such science because it leads men to be less sure of their place in the world.  It leads them to 
the knowledge that they cannot trust the evidence of their senses.
Marcuse, more than Arendt or Weil, is conflicted about the human mind, as his 
approach to science demonstrates. He is aware of the partiality of the mind, but also believes 
that it is our only vehicle for liberation.  Because the human mind is fallible, truth cannot be 
discovered privately, but must be created publicly, in the interplay of ideas, of presence and 
absence, of art and tragedy.  For Marcuse, scientific rationality denies the experience of the 
senses in a way that supports, rather than subverts, existing institutions.  Unlike a dialogic, 
public exchange of ideas, “scientific subversion of the immediate experience which 
establishes the truth of science against that of immediate experience does not develop the 
concepts which carry in themselves the protest and the refusal” (Marcuse, One Dimensional 
Man, 140).
Thus, like Marx, Marcuse sees that the productive capacity of society could be 
directed towards freeing men from necessity, rather than enslaving them to false/constructed 
wants.  If people no longer had to spend their lives in the realm of necessity, “truth and a true 
human existence would be in a strict and real sense universal” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional 
Man, 129.  Emphasis in the original).  Rationality, in this understanding, would be “a mode 
of thought and action which is geared to reduce ignorance, destruction, brutality, and 
oppression” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 148).
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Politics of Refusal
Like Weil and Arendt, Marcuse sees distinction disappearing.  Where Weil sees the 
loss of distinction between communities, and Arendt identifies the shift from classes to 
masses, Marcuse is most concerned about the disappearing distinction between individual 
and social will, the creation and maintenance of societies in which “the political needs of 
society become individual needs and aspirations” (Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, xli).  
This disappearing distinction creates a world in which an individual’s thoughts, desires and 
even their conception of what is possible become conflated with those of society.  Man thus 
becomes one-dimensional.  One might say that man stands in the full sun of totalitarianism, 
and lacks a shadow: there is no negative, no hidden or unstated quality to his life.  Under 
such circumstances, “contradiction becomes the very form of truth and movement” and 
reason becomes “the power of the negative” (Marcuse, Negations, xiv).  Politics also 
becomes one-dimensional, and thus, unfree.  In a way, Marcuse, like Arendt, distrusts the 
presence of the social within the political, though he puts it this way: “[one-dimensional 
society] thus obliterates the opposition between public and private existence, between 
individual and social needs” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, xlvii).
Because Marcuse remains enamored with, and indebted to, Marxist theory, he tends 
to emphasize the idea of struggle between those who have power and those who lack it.  In 
Marcuse’s work, he elaborates Marx’s conception of the means of production.  Marx, being a 
materialist, saw that the physical relations of power were capable of producing different 
kinds of awareness—that the consciousness of the bourgeoisie would be different from the 
consciousness of the proletariat.  The true interest of the proletariat would be obscured by the 
material relations of power.  These relations of power, however, could (and would) be 
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unmasked.  The false consciousness of the proletariat would be overcome and they would 
understand their true enemy and their true interest.
“WE LOVE THE BEAUTY OF THE WORLD”12
Marcuse, Weil, and Arendt turn to many of the same possibilities for alternative 
consciousness: the reappraisal of reason and rationality, the maintenance of the unique and 
extraordinary, and the valuation of the world and human community.  They believe, against 
considerable evidence, that human beings may progress to a more just and free society; that 
progress is measured by “the possibilities of ameliorating the human condition” (Marcuse, 
One-Dimensional Man, 16).
They argue that there is a need for a new language, one that moves away from the 
technical, managerial, organizational language.   Such language as we use now is 
“transmitted in a style…in which the structure of a sentence is abridged and condensed in 
such a way that no tension, no ‘space’ is left between the parts of the sentence” (Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, 387).  This form of speech, which seemingly tells all, resolves all 
of the ambiguity necessary for art and meaning.  As such a language collapses (should it 
collapse) Marcuse hopes for new language, and new meaning, to emerge: “Deprived of his 
false fathers, leaders, friends and representatives, he would have to learn his ABCs again.  
But the words and sentences which he would form might come out very differently, and so 
might his aspirations and fears” (1964: 246).  Word and deed must be reunited, so that speech 
once again becomes a meaningful form of action.   
It is through political action, through acting in concert with others, that a human 
society may fulfill its potential.  Marcuse and Arendt explicitly believe that it is “the political 
12
 Weil, The Need for Roots, 10.
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universe in which, alone, freedom can be attained” (Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, 
50).  Political freedom means not only the freedom to act, but also to be liberated from 
politics over which individuals have no control (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 4).  
Freedom in this view is multidimensional: freedom in concert with others, freedom from 
force and violence, freedom from necessity.  The freedom people enjoy in advanced 
captialist societies, they suggest, is a flat kind of freedom.  It is only the freedom to possess, 
consume, and labor.
Human freedom for each of these thinkers implies human responsibility.  There is 
responsibility to the community in which one lives, to the history of that community, and to 
its future members.  Our human reason must be used for the right ends.  It must lead us to 
understand the world in which we live and our place in it.  It must be more than abstract—it 
must impel us to action.  Weil, Marcuse and Arendt are committed to closing the gap 
between theory and praxis.  They envision a world in which human potential is actualized, a 
world in which human activity has as an end the rational use of productive facilities towards 
the establishment of greater human freedom.  They emphasize that human activity must have 
an end in two senses—both as a goal to be reached and as the possibility of something being 
finished, accomplished.  Marcuse writes, “Life as an end is qualitatively different from life as 
a means” (One-Dimensional Man 17).  Each thinker is attempting to carve out a space that is 
stable but not stagnant, a society in which there is order that is not oppressive.
Such a society would rest on legitimate authority.  This would be an authority that did 
not require force to rule; that would not have to turn to coercion in order to ensure obedience.  
Citizens would know one another, so that words and deeds would remain connected.  The 
community would be aware of its history and would seek to transmit that history to their 
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children (in a way that it did not become propagandistic).  It is of great importance to all 
three thinkers that society does not become ahistorical, and for all of them this has to do with 
truth claims.  Without knowledge of (specific, local) history, facts become nothing more than 
compelling stories.  The creation of the history of a community will belong to those who can 
tell the most compelling and coherent story, even if it is untrue, about the society and its 
members.  
What, if any, role is there for the nation-state in this vision of politics? Weil, of 
course, considers the nation-state itself a sign of uprootedness.  Arendt considers the nation-
state the progenitor of propaganda and, also, as exercising illegitimate authority over its 
members.  Marcuse sees vested interests—corporate interests—manifested in the nation-
state.  In the face of rooted, local, particular communities, would the nation-state disappear, 
or would it merely become irrelevant to the daily lives of the community?  It seems clear that 
the nation-state cannot be the basis of identity and cannot be that to which people give their 
ultimate loyalty.  Arendt feels that to command by force belongs to the realm of the 
household, the social, and not to the political.  Bringing social concerns into the realm of the 
political collapses the distinction between household and polis, and opens up the possibility 
of patriarchal, paternal politics in every level of society.  People thus become servile (Weil) 
rather than obedient, and obey because of fear of punishment (the wrath of the father) rather 
than because they acknowledge the presence of legitimate authority.
Perhaps naturally, there is a tendency among philosophers, expressed from Socrates 
to our three thinkers here, to privilege the philosophic life above all other forms of life.  
Above all, they are urging people to consider, to think: “the highest and perhaps purest 
activity of which men are capable [is] the activity of thinking” (Arendt, The Human 
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Condition 5).  Without critical thought, Weil tells us, there is no possibility of freedom, and 
“where the light of intelligence grows dim, it is not very long before the love of the good 
becomes lost” (Weil, The Need for Roots, 26).  Marcuse and Arendt’s discussion of necessity 
exemplifies this hierarchy of human activity, in which philosophic conderation is at the top.  
In her idealization of Greek citizen life, Arendt neglects the amount of work it took on the 
part of those considered too lowly to be citizens—slaves and women—that enabled the 
creation of the public sphere.  Even now, the increased participation of women in the public 
sphere rests too often on the labor of other women  (Atlantic Monthly, April 2004).  Marcuse 
hopes that the productive capacity of technological society will set ever more people free 
from necessity, but this raises two problems.  The first is that reappropriation of technology 
is difficult, especially given the critiques levelled at it by Marcuse and Arendt.  Is there a way 
to use productive technology that doesn’t shape and deform men, that doesn’t make them 
slaves to the machines?  The logical implication of their critique of technological production 
is that the machines would have to be built over, using entirely different design criteria.  The 
second is that, given Arendt and Weil’s critiques of the way use of industrial machinery 
deforms and reshapes people, using such technology to set people free from necessity still 
requires that some submit to the exigencies of the machine. 
All three thinkers, to greater and lesser degrees, are open to charges of nostalgia.  
Even Marcuse, who is perhaps least nostalgic for the hierarchy and rigidity of old, writes 
eloquently of the “verse and prose” of the pre-technological society and culture.  Such a 
culture contains “the rhythm of those who wander or ride in carriages, who have the time and 
the pleasure to think, contemplate, feel and narrate” and while it is clear that Marcuse mourns 
the loss of these rhythms, he also knows that “only dreams and childlike regressions can 
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recapture it” (Marcuse, Negations, 71).  Arendt seems especially susceptible to this charge; 
feminist and democratic theorists have pointed out that life in the Greek city-states took for 
granted inequalities between men and women and masters and slaves that would not now be 
accepted as legitimate.  Further, the rooted and stable communities prized by Weil and 
Arendt were also exclusionary and highly disciplinary for their members.
Though they would have us recognize scientific enterprise as a political enterprise, 
this is more complicated than it would first seem.  It is true that the developments of science 
inevitably influence the development of politics, and it is also true that politics applies 
science and scientific development.  What would it mean, practically, to recognize scientific 
consciousness as political consciousness?  Would there be certain limits to scientific inquiry 
that would be determined by politics?  Or would politics be rightly understood as a scientific 
pursuit?  And, if so, isn’t a scientific politics a rather totalitarian thought?  In short, though I 
empathize with their critique of the applications of science through technology, it seems to 
me that the scientific pursuit of knowledge can be a critical and subversive pursuit itself.  
Perhaps what is wrong with science is that, like the pursuit of truth in ancient times, the 
pursuit of scientific knowledge is too often open only to those who have a certain freedom 
from necessity.  What is wrong with science, in my view, is not that it has too much 
influence, but rather that it has too little; that the method and critical thought required in 
scientific pursuits is widely regarded (at least in American society) as worthless if it does not 
lead to new and lucrative technologies.  
 Human beings are driven by two desires that at times conflict: the first, to be free to 
pursue individual fulfillment, and the second, to be at one with a community, to feel unity 
with others.  The vision that these thinkers offer of a non-totalitarian, un-organized (so to 
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speak) society is a compelling vision.  It is one that offers fulfillment of both these needs 
simultaneously.  Yet there were times when, especially while reading Marcuse, I was 
troubled.  Doesn’t a totalitarian society promise the same?  It is true that a totalitarian society 
would not allow for the fulfillment of individuality.  It would only offer the illusion of doing 
so.  Who, however, will tell the people that they are living a lie?  And why are they likely to 
be believed?  The ongoing problem with Marxism is that it presumes that once people know 
[their true interests their behavior will change.  This leaves a class of people (presumably 
elite) who know the truth and must transmit it to the masses, for their own good.  
A critical thinker must assume that people wish to be free, that the reason they are not 
is because of forces aligned against them—that they do not know their true interest, nor their 
true position.  A critical thinker must assume that, once their unfreedom is shown to the 
people, they will cast off their cloak of servitude and become appropriately philosophical.  
This attitude, it seems to me, is problematic.  First, because it does assume that some people 
have knowledge that other’s lack.  It also assumes that people want this knowledge, that they 
are aware of a lack in their own worldview.  The fear that I think underlies the work of all 
three of the thinkers discussed here is that their arguments for the complicated, the difficult, 
the new and the unique, will ultimately lose to arguments that are easy and comforting, 
which do not require people to do very much or think too hard.  In short, they fear that 
Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor was right.
The Grand Inquisitor tells us that in fact, people seek to avoid freedom, not to 
embrace it.  That people prefer a comforting fiction to a hard truth.  That, if they are going to 
be instructed by an elite who will tell them who they really are and what they really want, 
they would prefer an elite that takes as much of the responsibility off their hands as possible.  
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Weil, Marcuse and Arendt represent the elite who would like to tell people what their true 
interest is and then instruct them in the burden of their responsibility for self, others, and 
community.  They expect that people will be willing to assume such a burden because for 
them, freedom is incomplete without this understanding of responsibility.  This is not the 
freedom promised by capitalism, however, and it is not a freedom that is present in the lives 
of people living in large, disconnected, mass society.  When confronting the Christ-character 
in the allegory, the Grand Inquisitor says words that may have come from Marcuse himself:  
“But let me tell Thee that now, to-day, people are more persuaded than ever that they have 
perfect freedom, yet they have brought their freedom to us and laid it humbly at our feet. But 
that has been our doing” (Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamozov, 130).  As long as men 
desire bread more than freedom, the Grand Inquisitor argues, there will never be enough 
bread for all; yet it is the abundance of bread, the freedom from necessity, upon which the 
critical thought of Marcuse, Weil and Arendt rests.
What sets these thinkers apart, what drives them more than any other consideration, is 
love for the world and the people in it.  They are driven by a deep compassion, by the belief 
that “in the exigencies of thought and in the madness of love is the destructive refusal of the 
established ways of life” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 126).  They want to open the 
door to genius, understood as the capacity to generate, to begin anew, and to create 
something entirely unique.  They are individualists who stand against mass society.  They 
wish to teach people to rationally apprehend the world through their senses, through Eros and 
Logos. Confronted with abundant evidence of human cruelty, they would be excused for 
becoming cynical and misanthropic.  Instead, they remain humanists—skeptical humanists, 
perhaps, but still dedicated to human emancipation and the realization of human potential.
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